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Paternalism in Agricultural Labor
Economists generally treat institutions as exogenous and examine their impact on the economy. But institutions, which define the "rules of the game" in an economy and the payoffs to pursuing different strategies, can change over time. Understanding the forces that prompt changes in institutions and how the payoffs to strategies change in response to institutional changes is important for understanding the developmental pattern of societies.' For example, explicit contracts may be the most efficient means of structuring transactions under one institutional regime, but less formal agreements with entirely different enforcement mechanisms may be most efficient under another. Different ways of structuring transactions may lead to different growth paths.
In this paper we examine the rise and decline of paternalism in Southern labor relations. By "paternalism" we mean an implicit contract whereby workers exchange dependable labor services for a variety of goods and services. "Dependable" implies a long-term commitment to an employer that transcends the textbook notion of spotmarket exchange. In return, workers receive such goods and services as credit, housing, medical and old-age assistance, and most importantly, protection from acts of violence. Paternalism, we argue, emerged along with a particular institution-the system of social control that emerged in the late 19th
I. Some Historical Background on Paternalism in the South3
The system of paternalism in place in the 1930's was not a simple extension of the antebellum master-slave relationship into the postbellum Southern economy. It was instead the product of the dislocation occasioned by the Civil War and the actions of planters trying to secure an adequate labor supply in these circumstances.
The initial response of planters to the difficulties of keeping laborers in the immediate postwar period was to offer former slaves a variety of nonmonetary inducements to remain at least through the harvest of the present crop. The rise of virulent racism in the post-Reconstruction period presented planters with an opportunity to offer to their workers protection from racist violence and the capricious judgments of a racist legal system, in exchange for continued dependable service in the planters' fields. Their role as protector of the physical safety of their workers evolved in the 20th century into a more general role as protector of workers in commercial and legal transactions and in many dealings with the world outside the plantation. That role ensured the opposition of planters to federal interference in Southern labor and race relations in the first half of the 20th century.
After the Civil War, Southern agriculture faced enormous difficulties. The abolition of slavery, the coercive system which had organized labor relations before the war, was clearly the greatest problem. Though the South suffered tremendous physical destruction, including the loss of livestock, fences, and barns, and though many of its fields had been neglected throughout the war, what most concerned planters was the lack of a system to assure an adequate supply of labor (N. B. Cloud, 1867; U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1867). Fields could be rehabilitated and new workstock and animals purchased after a season or two of hardship-farmers had often been forced to do so in the past after natural disasters-but replacing slavery with a new system was a more daunting task. Some former masters, those "who had dealt honorably and humanely towards their slaves," were able to retain many of their former fieldhands (U.S. Congress, 1866 p. 125).4 Most planters, 2By examining both the rise and the fall of paternalism in Southern agricultural contracts, we are less open to the criticisms that plague functionalist explanations: much work in the applied analysis of contracting suffers from explaining the existence of a contract solely by an appeal to its functions. 3We are grateful to Robert Higgs for providing much of the primary source material on which this section is based. 4Most of those hiring large numbers of hands after the war were the same planters who had controlled the largest plantations before the war. For evidence on the lack of turnover in the "plantation elite" as a result of though, particularly those who were not so highly regarded by their former slaves, had great difficulty in satisfying their demand for labor (see Freedmen's Bureau, 1866 p. 95). 5 Into this chaos stepped the Freedmen's Bureau as an intermediary, at least for a short time. The Bureau, an agency of the federal government, initially enjoyed the trust of the freedmen. As a repository of their trust, it could "disabuse them of any extravagant notions and expectations... [and] administer them good advice and be voluntarily obeyed" (Carl Schurz, 1866 p. 40). The Bureau had the power to compel the observance of labor contracts and for this earned the early respect of planters. The Freedmen's Bureau had done nothing to change the fact that the abolition of slavery had raised the cost of labor.6 During the period of excess demand for labor which existed until the adjustment to this new, higher equilibrium wage, some planters raided their competitors for labor and bitterly complained as their own work forces were raided.
By 1869, the Bureau had ceased to function as a go-between and guarantor. Both planters and freedmen seem to have seen less need for the offices of the agency after only three years experience with it, perhaps because of a desire for greater flexibility than the Bureau-approved contracts allowed (Ralph Shlomowitz, 1978 p. 35). The Bureau had attempted to stabilize the agricultural labor market in the first confused years after emancipation.7 The demise of the Freedmen's Bureau left planters and freedmen to contract among themselves directly. Writing in 1872, one observer noted conditions much like those in the immediate aftermath of the war: workers were being hired away by competing employers, leaving planters with insufficient labor to bring in the crop, and employers were failing to fulfill the terms of their contracts with their workers (Charles Stearns, 1872 pp. 107-8). Securing adequate labor was described as "a matter of grave uncertainty and deep anxiety" for every planter (Southerner, 1871 p. 329).
In these circumstances, some planters chose a new course, turning to honesty, fair-dealing, and a host of nonwage aspects of their relationship with their workers as additional margins for competition (see Phillip A. Bruce, 1889 pp. 180-1; H. C. Taylor, 1925 p. 329).8 The amenities which the war, see Jay R. Mandle (1973) , Jonathan M. Wiener (1978) , and Michael Wayne (1983). After Reconstruction, it was the planter elite rather than the petty merchants who retained the greatest political and economic power in the rural South. For example, crop lien laws gave planters rather than merchants first claim on the output of sharecroppers indebted to both (Harold D. Woodman, 1979 p. 328). Woodman has also shown that laws relegated sharecroppers to the legal status of wage workers, enhancing the power of landlords (Woodman, 1979 pp. 324-6).
5See Leon F. Litwack (1979) and Gerald D. Jaynes (1986 pp. 207-23) for a discussion of the disorder in agricultural labor markets immediately following the Civil War. 6Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch (1978) argue that emancipation decreased the labor supply of former slaves, who in effect bought greater leisure. Robert W. Fogel (1989) suggests that planters increased their demand for labor after emancipation, because more workers were needed to do the work that had previously been done under the onerous gang system. In either case, the result would have been an increase in the price of labor. 7The Bureau's legacy was its intermediation-the first by any federal agency and the last for a long time -in the South's evolving system of labor relations. Though such intervention was attempted again by the Resettlement Administration and the Farm Security Administration in the 1930's, the context had changed considerably by then, and the results were altogether different (see Alston and Ferrie, 1985b) . 8Jaynes (1986 pp. 78-9, 104-6, 121) describes the introduction of such arrangements between planters and their wage workers in the immediate antebellum period, even before the demise of the Freedmen's Bureau. He does not explore the persistence of these relationships into the post-Reconstruction period or into the 20th century as we have elsewhere (Alston and Ferrie, 1989 ). Jaynes views "market paternalism"-his term for these arrangements-and tenancy and share contracts as substitutes used by planters for reducing monitoring costs. We believe that such paternalistic arrangements were not only complementary to tenancy and share contracts in reducing monitoring costs, but were actually more likely to be given to tenants and croppers than to wage workers. A long-term relationship like that between planters and their tenants and croppers made such arrangements more effective as monitoring devices. Such arrangements were also in- The new political structure was not the product of accident or other impersonal forces, nor of decisions demanded by the masses, nor even the white masses. The system which insured the absolute control of predominantly black counties by upper-class whites, the elimination in most areas of parties as a means of organized competition between politicians, and, in general, the nonrepresentation of lower class interests in political decision-making was shaped by those who stood to benefit most from it-Democrats, usually from the Black Belt and always socioeconomically privileged. This is the sense in which we view the institution of social control in the South as "endogenous": it was the product of decisions made by the white rural elite.10 The creasingly important as wage workers in gangs were replaced by geographically dispersed tenants and croppers. The assignment of tenants and croppers to specific plots created an incentive for planters to reduce turnover and prevent the departure of tenants and croppers in possession of location-specific farming knowledge. The literature on paternalism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (cited in Alston and Ferrie [1989] ) is the basis for our view that these arrangements continued with the transition away from an exclusive reliance on wage labor, and that these arrangements were in fact of even greater value to planters when they employed tenants and croppers than they had been when only wage workers were employed.
9For a more general view of the experience of blacks in the post-emancipation Southern economy, see Robert Higgs (1977) . 10Gavin Wright (1986 p. 122) argues that disfranchisement "was a by-product of the agrarian movement," a movement which he describes as a result of weak world cotton demand in the 1890's. Kousser (1974 pp. 6-8) provides a similar explanation for the disfranchisement of both blacks and poor whites, though one that does not rely on the impact of world rise of the institution of social control led in turn to the increased use of protection in paternalistic contracts. Planters increasingly offered protection to their faithful black workers as the social and legal environment became more hostile toward blacks-a hostility which, over several decades, the white rural elite was instrumental in creating.
Thus, to limit the departure of their own workers from the South, many planters came to serve as the protectors for their workers as well as the providers of many of their material needs. Planters had posted bond for their workers and accompanied them to court before, but with the pronounced change in the political, legal, and social climate at the turn of the century, such practices took on added importance."
In the following years, the scope of planters' paternalism expanded, until planters had come to act as intermediaries between their workers and much of the outside world. Planters exercised control over the credit extended to their workers, but they were also willing to "stand good" for their workers' debts with local merchants.'2 Planters reported significant outlays for the payment of doctors' bills, the establishment and maintenance of schools and churches, and various unspecified forms of entertainment (Woofter, 1936 The result was a system of thorough paternalism in which planters looked after most aspects of their workers' lives, and workers responded by offering their loyalty to their patron. Planters had to some degree solved the labor-supply problem they had faced at emancipation: provision of paternalism allowed them to tie black workers to the land in a world of free contracting, though not as firmly as the law had bound black workers under slavery, because coercion was no longer as viable, and exit was an option. They were able to reduce the cost of monitoring labor by providing workers with valuable services which they would forfeit if they were caught shirking. They offered both black and white workers a wide array of nonwage benefits, as well as assistance in commercial and legal transactions, and in addition provided their black workers with protection from the power of the state and the racial hostility of many whites.
The ability of planters to keep labor both cheap and dependable required not only that they continue to supply the full range of paternalistic benefits to their workers, but also that the external threat posed by a racist state continue. Furthermore, planters needed to ensure that no other party stepped forward to act as the workers' protector in commercial and legal dealings. In short, planters had an interest in maintaining a racist state and preventing federal interference in race and labor issues. Woofter (1936 pp. 31-2) described some of the social and economic aspects of patercotton demand. Blacks were excluded from the electoral process by the Black Belt elites because "The end of Negro voting would solidify their control over their tenants and free them from having to deal with elected or appointed black officials, a type of contact almost all Southern whites found distasteful" (p. 7). The elites excluded poor, up-country whites to prevent conflict over issues such as taxes and, more generally, to achieve political hegemony in state politics. In the U.S. South, perhaps the most important aspect of paternalism was the protection planters offered from violence perpetrated by the larger community. Protection was important for all agricultural workers, but particularly for black workers, because they lacked civil rights, and society condoned violence. Paternalism was more than shelter from physical threats; it could also involve interceding in commercial transactions, obtaining medical care, providing influence or money to bail a son out of jail, or settling familial disputes.'4 White workers were not for the most part beneficiaries of paternalistic arrangements, both because they had a lower demand for protection from violence and because they were not as likely as blacks to be employed on plantations. Plantation owners were more likely than other employers to supply paternalism, both because of their political power and because of economies of scale in the provision of some aspects of paternalism, such as housing or medical care.
Paternalism is most prevalent in premechanized and non-science-based agriculture. Before the advent of scientific advances that stabilized yields, workers possessed farm-specific knowledge, which gave landlords an incentive to curb the migration of tenants with such knowledge. Before mechanization, monitoring labor effort was costly because workers were spread over a considerable physical distance, and linkage of reward with effort was difficult because there could be considerable variation in output the cause of which was difficult to determine. Examples abound: Did the mule go lame naturally or did the workers mistreat the mule? Was the shortfall in output due to too little rain or too little work effort? Paternalism reduced these monitoring costs by reducing workers' tendency to shirk, by raising the costs of shirking and by increasing the length of the time horizon over which workers made decisions. 15 Because paternalism is a long-term contract of sorts, it may induce in workers a sense that they, as well as the landlord, gain from long-run improvements to soil fertility. This is especially true for fixed-rent tenants who are residual claimants of any given year's output. Paternalism may also reduce the taste for shirking if it is viewed by workers not as a market transaction, but rather as benevolence from the patron. Under such conditions workers respond with Given that the Southern delegation did not represent a majority in either house of Congress, how were they able to satisfy the desires of their rural elite constituents? Though never an absolute majority, Southern Democrats represented a substantial and influential percentage of the Democratic party. At present there is a lively debate over whether parties have had much influence over decision-making in Congress in the 20th century.'8 Given that the party leadership is in charge of appointments to committees, it is difficult to deny that party leaders can ultimately influence decisionmaking. However, because short-run authority over legislation is ceded to committees, the composition of committees, when 16 16A similar model is described in George A. Akerlof (1982) .
170f course, instead of paternalistic goods and services, landlords could pay a higher wage than a worker's opportunity wage. Our argument is that paternalism is cheaper than using cash. Even after legislation passes in the House or Senate, committees still exercise disproportionate power. Differences in proposed legislation between the House and Senate are settled in conference between representatives of each chamber who are members of the relevant committees from which the proposed legislation emanated. In addition, after the legislation is law, the committees are the watchdogs over its implementation.
As in Congress as a whole, decision-making within committees is not democratic. Steven S. Smith (1989 p. 13) argues that ... widely recognized norms of apprenticeship and committee deference served to limit effective participation to a few senior committee members. Moreover, the distribution of resources and parliamentary prerogatives advantaged senior, majorityparty, committee chairmen in both chambers.
Chairmen of committees set committee meeting times, made appointments to subcommittees, hired the professional staff, led the floor debate on the legislation reported out of their committees, and served on conference committees to reconcile differences between the two houses of Congress.
The importance of committees is not static, but needs to be viewed in a historical context. Seniority in committees was so important in the period from the end of World War II to the early 1970's because party 19The amount of authority allowed committees may depend on the cohesiveness of the majority party. When parties are factionalized, as the Democratic party was from the New Deal to approximately 1970, coalitions need to be formed and enforced in order for a party to be effective in policy-making. By allowing committees to exercise agenda control, the Democratic party held together the alliance based on Southern support for the party platform in return for noninterference in Southern labor and race relations.
20Ceding control over legislation to committees enables legislators to increase the probability that legislation will not be reversed by future Congresses (see Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, 1984; Weingast and William Marshall, 1988) . 21In the postwar period, the committee structure determined the course of legislation as long as it was a time of "business as usual." If an issue received widespread national attention, the norms of reciprocity that gave committees some of their agenda control no longer functioned. For example, the attention given to the civil-rights movement in the media propelled civil rights to be examined by Congress as a whole-more as we naively think democracies should function-but civil-rights legislation, like the decision to go to war, is a marked exception to the general rule we have described. For most issues in the postwar period, an understanding of the makeup of committees is crucial for achieving an understanding of legislative outcomes. Though the handwriting was on the wall in the early 1960's, except for the removal of the veto power of the Rules Committee for one congress (1963) (1964) , no important changes occurred in committee structure. However, this need not imply that the behavior of Southern congressmen was not influenced. Foreseeing that structural change was in the works and being guided by Northern liberals, Southerners may have tempered their conservative behavior in an effort to forestall change in the institutional structure of Congress. Naturally, Southerners would have given in on the issues that affected them the least, though it may have been in the interest of any individual congressman not to do so. 22 We maintain that, given the ability of Southern agriculture to mechanize at relatively low cost, to shift into less labor-intensive crops prompted in part by government agricultural programs, and to stabilize yields through scientific advances such as weed control and fertilization, opposition to federal welfare was no longer as important to the Southern elite.
Understanding the importance of seniority in the institutional workings of Congress makes apparent why the South could succeed in blocking federal interference: Southern members had far greater seniority Mechanization and the accompanying science-based technology reduced the economic incentive to provide paternalism. The
22
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this point. 23In this section, and throughout the paper, we focus on the impact that mechanization and its accompanying technology had on paternalism because we maintain that mechanization was the most important causal factor. However, mechanization was not the only factor leading to a decline in paternalism. Government agricultural programs and the declining profitability of cotton relative to other crops led to a shift out of cotton and into other crops and livestock. See Frank Maier (1969) Day (1967) contend that partial mechanization (i.e., the introduction of the tractor) caused both a decline in the number of tenants and a decline in the ratio of tenants to wage workers. Plowing with a tractor resulted in less labor demand throughout the season, as significant amounts of labor were now needed only for weeding and harvesting.
As a result, Day (1967 p. 439) argues, the "maintenance of sharecroppers the year round became uneconomic. Instead, a combination of resident wage labor and labor hired from nearby villages was favored." The logical difficulty with this view is that it sees sharecropping as an inflexible arrangement rather than a contractual form in which several margins can be adjusted. For example, just as the share could be adjusted, so too could in-kind benefits such as housing or medical care. Nevertheless, the observation that tenancy fell with partial mechanization is correct. We contend that the rationale for the decline in tenancy with partial mechanization is the same as the rationale in the case of complete mechanization: monitoring costs fall with standardized techniques and with the increased unemployment or underemployment wrought by a decline in the demand for labor. 27 Street (1957 pp. 218-27) argues that partial mechanization prompted a variety of changes in contractual arrangements. 1) During the war, when male labor was particularly scarce, females would receive a small sharecrop plot for hoeing and picking, and males, when home from jobs in war industries, would be hired on a part-time wage-labor basis. 2) Some landlords continued to use sharecroppers but charged croppers for tractor operations. 3) The landlord's share increased in recognition of his increased inputs. 4) Finally, the labor force was divided into two parts: enough share26Tenancy also fell for reasons other than mechanization. The most notable cause was the decline in cotton acreage prompted by government agricultural policy ostensibly aimed at soil conservation but actually proposed to raise farm income (see Aiken The decline in tenancy suggests that paternalism fell as well and fell most notably in the 1950's during the period of rapid mechanization.30 The decline in the number of tenants and in the ratio of tenants to wage workers prompted a reduction in the provision of a variety of in-kind goods and services to workers, most notably food and housing, because of economies of scale (Alston and Ferrie, 1986). Previously, if plantation owners provided their workers with food and shelter, they had more contact with them, became more familiar with them, and could thereby provide paternalism at a lower cost. This is because contact and knowledge allowed them to identify "good" workers more easily and provide them with greater paternalism, reinforcing in the minds of workers the causal link between performance and the receipt of paternalism. When fewer in-kind goods were provided, the reduced contact between employers and workers raised the cost of providing paternalism.31 28Street argues, as have others, that sharecrop contracts secure labor better than wage contracts. The argument is that sharecroppers stay through the harvest for their share, while wage workers are paid by the day, week, or month. This ignores the fact that some wage workers are contracted for the year. Furthermore, there seems to be no logical reason precluding the withholding of some wages until after harvest-say as a bonus like that some workers receive in ski resorts if they stay for the season. After all, as Woodman (1979) has noted, sharecroppers are legally wage workers paid with a share of the crop. The reason a sharecrop contract holds workers better is because sharecroppers earn more on average than wage workers. Therefore, given that landlords advance subsistence to both wage workers and croppers and withhold the rest until the end of the season, sharecroppers would forfeit more by leaving before the end of the season (Alston, 1981) .
29The fact that pull factors dominated migration in the 1940's is not evidence that paternalism was a failure in securing labor. We need to know the counterfactual: how much migration would have occurred in the absence of paternalism. We do know that planters responded to the tight labor market of the 1940's by individually offering more paternalistic benefits and by collectively fostering state and local government improvements in schools and other social services. The plantation elite were instrumental in encouraging state governments to provide better schools as a means of discouraging out-migration (see Robert A. Margo, 1991 Ch. 3). 30Though both the absolute number of tenants and their number relative to the size of the agricultural labor force peaked in the 1930 Census, there is considerable anecdotal evidence that paternalism was still used in the 1930's and the war years. Paternalism did not begin to decline immediately with the decline in tenancy for several reasons: 1) the unemployment that led to the substitution of wage workers for tenants was not expected to be permanent, and paternalism represented a longer-term contract than tenancy; 2) the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) which led to a reduction in labor demand and thereby a reduction in tenancy was initially an emergency measure whose future life was uncertain, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court's ruling it unconstitutional-we doubt that planters in the face of such uncertainty would have immediately abandoned paternalism as part of labor relations; and 3) the cost of using paternalism was in part subsidized through the funds of the Resettlement Administration, which the local elites controlled.
31We are advancing a supply-side story for the decline in paternalism, but there was no doubt a decline in the demand for paternalism caused by rising income and education levels, which would have diminished the value of planter intercession in many commercial transactions and in legal and social difficulties. However, unless one advocates a threshold model for the impact of education and income on paternalism, the steady climb in these factors would have had only a modest impact on the decline in paternalism because education and income had been rising over the course of the 20th century with little discernible impact on paternalism. An alternative demand explanation for the decline in paternalism is World War 11. After seeing how the At the same time, the onset of mechanization prompting the rapid decline in tenancy in the 1950's ushered in a period of relative labor surplus and with it an increased likelihood of unemployment (Day, 1967 Monitoring costs also fell because mechanization reduced variation in the marginal productivity of labor. Machines by their very nature standardize work output and limit the scope for shirking. For example, plowing or cultivating with a tractor provides less scope for shirking than plowing with a mule or cultivating with a hoe. With the tractor technology, employers could evaluate labor effort after a given task better than they could with the mule technology. The ability to monitor labor effort ex post reduced supervision costs and thereby part of the rationale for share contracts and paternalism. This created an additional incentive to negotiate wage contracts with the remaining laborers. Using the ratio of tractors to horses plus mules as a proxy for mechanization and supervision costs, Alston (1985) found that mechanization was negatively correlated over time and across space with the relative use of tenancy contracts in the ten major cotton-producing states in the South.32 The fact that paternalism and tenancy went hand in hand and that both were driven by supervision costs implies that if mechanization prompted a shift into wage contracts, then it also reduced the use of paternalism.
So far we have discussed the impact of mechanization on the supply of paternalism by white landowners. Mechanization also affected the demand for paternalism by primarily black farm workers in two ways. Paternalism was an implicit contract between workers and employers: in return for "good and faithful" labor, employers offered protection and other services. The timing of the exchange was important. "Good and faithful" labor came first, and then the landlord delivered. This relationship was maintained as long as workers expected planters to uphold their side of the bargain. If, during the 1950's, workers foresaw the incentive of planters to renege as mechanization proceeded, the incentive for them to toil in the present diminished as the demand for labor declined. To stimulate work effort, payment had to be made more coincident with labor effort. Paternalism became less effective. rest of the world worked, former tenants were reluctant to come back to a system of paternalism which they found demeaning. We suspect that World War II did change tastes for some in a way that made paternalistic arrangements less appealing, but this could not be the whole story because many tenants never had any war experience. The majority of Southern tenants did not leave the farm for work in war-related industries or military service in part due to the efforts of Southerners in limiting out-migration through emigration laws and draft deferments. In addition, returning veterans from World War I had not ushered in a period of diminished paternalistic relations in Southern agriculture. 32 Monitoring costs may have fallen for another reason as well. Unlike mules, tractors or cotton-pickers were seldom owned by workers. When landlords owned the capital equipment, they had an incentive to monitor its use. If they were present for this reason, the marginal costs of monitoring labor fell and so too did the incentive for tenancy and paternalism (see Alston and Higgs, 1982 Johnson (1941) found that the best indicator of social conditions in the South-education and race relations among others-was cotton cultivation. Our analysis suggests the reason. Under paternalism, in addition to providing "good and faithful" labor, agricultural tenants showed deference to their landlords, while the system of social control required that black tenants show deference to whites at large.34 Employers may have insisted on deference because of its impact on production, even though many tenants detested it: deference may have reinforced the hierarchical relationship between landlords and tenants and increased the effectiveness of authority and supervision.35 Tenancy facilitated the maintenance of deference and of racial etiquette in general.
Tenants received most of their income in-kind. Most notable was the purchasing power advanced at plantation stores or designated stores in the county or town. Black tenants and croppers frequently did not have discretion over where they shopped. To merchants, they were a guaranteed clientele. This enabled merchants to treat blacks differentially from whites without cost. For example, merchants did not permit blacks to try on clothing and would even stop waiting on a black customer to wait on white customers who subsequently entered the store (Powdermaker, 1978 p. 50).
For black agricultural workers, the decline in tenancy brought with it a rise in cash income relative to kind, both because of a reduction in economies of scale in supplying in-kind goods and because wage workers were generally paid in cash and not given advances. Displaced tenants, if they found employment, got jobs that paid cash wages. In addition, income levels were rising in general, further increasing discre- [T]he dependent family began to acquire training in personal and family responsibility and in discriminating buying. The family seemed to take on a sense of self-direction: when furnished through a commissary, the head of the house and other members went several times a week to get this or that, each time acknowledging their dependence and usually stressing it in order to get what was wanted. When a cash allowance was given a tenant, he reported to the landlord at the first of the month to get what was his by agreement. With this money he went forth to buy where he thought he was getting the best values for his money, and where he was treated with the most consideration.
As a result, race etiquette and deference to whites at large, which had been enforced in part through tenancy and the absence of cash, were being threatened as tenancy declined.
Better treatment of blacks in commercial transactions prompted demands by blacks for better treatment in society. Payment of cash and fewer personal dealings with employers divorced work and social life. Blacks were not independent economically of whites, but the frequency with which they were required to demonstrate dependence through deferential behavior declined as tenancy declined. If this was true, blacks would have perceived race relations as better where tenancy was lower. And they did.
As part of a study of Southern politics in 1961, Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro (1966) collected data on the perception of race relations by blacks in communities across the South. Alston (1986) used these data to test for the influence of tenancy on race relations. In an analysis controlling for other influences (median black income, degree of ruralness, the ratio of black population to total population, education, and exposure to television), Alston found results consistent with the hypothesis that tenancy was correlated with traditional Southern race etiquette: a high level of tenancy was the only variable that was consistently and strongly associated with perceptions of poor race relations. This suggests that, as tenancy rates fell, the institution of social control was weakened. Because paternalism was linked to the system of social control, the use of paternalism would have declined as well. Even before the movement for civil rights at the federal level, then, technological forces were working to undermine the South's traditional system of race relations-what we have called its system of " social control"-and the paternalistic relations that it fostered. The point to which we wish to draw attention is the curious behavior of Southern congressmen in the 1960's. They no longer blocked welfare legislation as they had formerly. Two explanations are possible. Either Southerners lost political power or they no longer had as much incentive to thwart the expansion of the welfare state. We argue that Southern politicians did not lose 1947-1960 1961-1964 1965-1970 1947-1960 1961-1964 1965-1970 A Because of the dominance of the Democratic party in the South, Southern congressmen were more senior on average than congressmen in other regions. Consequently, they disproportionately chaired and occupied the senior seats on committees in the postwar period, the era of strong committee chairs. In Table 1 Perhaps more importantly, civil rights were coming to the South whether white Southerners wanted them or not-and many white Southerners vehemently opposed them. By the 1960's, however, the threat of civil rights to the white South was no longer its impact on labor relations. Civil rights were actually beneficial to the business community and were seen by many businessmen as such (Wright, 1986 p. 268; Bruce J. Schulman, 1991 pp. 209-10). Rather, civil rights were a direct assault on white supremacy, a cornerstone of the institution of social control in the South. Given that federal welfare was no longer seen as a threat to labor relations and that civil rights were on the horizon, the white Southern rural elite chose to encourage black outmigration to limit the impact of civil rights.
Evidence from the birth and life of the Economic Opportunity Act is consistent with our view that mechanization destroyed the economic motive for supplying paternalism Step by step, Southern congressmen released welfare for the aged poor from local government, passing control to the federal government as the burden of maintaining aged blacks surpassed their economic value and as the threat that direct cash payments to an older relative would subsidize an entire family became less critical to a changing plantation economy. and that Southerners worked to limit the anticipated impact of civil rights in the South by promoting out-migration and assuring that control of new federal programs remained in their hands. The Economic Opportunity Bill was conceived in the White House as the centerpiece of the Johnson Administration's War on Poverty. The bill consisted of six parts, only the first three of which were controversial. Title I dealt with youth unemployment and was essentially a redraft of a bill that had previously stalled in the House Rules Committee, which was chaired by Representative Howard Smith (D-VA). The most radical part of the bill was Title II, which established urban and rural community-action programs. What made the programs radical was that they gave no role to state and local governments. The goal was to involve the poor directly and make an end-run around urban bureaucracies. Because poverty had previously been mostly a local issue, the biggest threat was to mayors of large cities. Title III, rural economic opportunity programs, included grants aimed at land reform, principally Southern land reform, the goal of which was to purchase tracts of land for resale to tenants and sharecroppers.
The important distinction made in Title I was that a new "emphasis [was] placed on large 'urban' training and remedial-education centers rather than on conservation camps" (James Sundquist, 1969 p. 26). In Title II, Southerners ensured that governors were given the right to veto the placement of Job Corps Centers and Community Action Programs in their states.39 Southerners were also concerned that community-action grants would be disruptive to the Southern way of life. Their concern was that the grants might go to groups not under the control of the local power structure. To limit this threat, Southerners "modified the legislation to require grantee organizations either to be public agencies or, if private nonprofit agencies, to have an established record of concern with the problems of the poor, or else a link to such an established record by being created by an established agency" (Adam Yarmolinsky, 1969 p. 46) . It was not that congressmen outside the South favored the administration's attempt at bypassing local control, but rather that Southern congressmen were in a better position to do something about it.40 Grants for land reform in Title III were struck from the final bill as well.
The 42Schulman (1991 pp. 180-1) argues that Southerners were opposed to welfare programs in general. Southerners, however, were not unanimous in their opposition, while they had been almost unanimous in the past: as we noted earlier, 60 Southern Democrats voted for this legislation in the House, while in the Senate, half the Southern delegation voted in favor of the bill. Schulman's evidence on the opposition to welfare is consistent with our hypothesis that Southerners retained sufficient political power to shape welfare programs to encourage rural out-migration and thereby limit the impact of welfare in the rural South. 
